Sunday, March 9, 2014

# 8





Aha! You thought we were done with the 1st Prussian-Danish War.

 

One more event. It affected most wars up to now.



Thus from the political point of view, the stormy period which broke out in 1848 had ended with the humiliation of Prussia, and her definite subordination to her rival Austria; and the sense of inferiority was increased by the military setback she had received elsewhere at the hands of a third-rate Power.
The war with Denmark closed with the marked discomfiture of Prussia.
The origin of that contest lies buried in one of the most difficult and complicated questions of European history---that of Schleswig-Holstein, and it might be passed by without remark were it not---as has been truly said---that the conflicts of 1864 and 1866 can no more be understood without a knowledge of that of 1848, than the siege of Troy can be understand without a knowledge of the abduction of Helen.
To use Moltke's words it was "the first link of a chain which led to Nicholsburg an Versailles."

As far back as 1460 the two duchies had been united to the kingdom of Denmark; Holstein, however, has also formed part of the Holy Roman Empire though Schleswig had not; both duchies contained large numbers of inhabitants of German origin who were discontented with their lot; and the Salic law prevailed both in Schleswig and Holstein, but not in Denmark. These ingredients of trouble when thrown into the seething pot of 1848 soon boiled into war.
Several German monarchs, anxious to find a safety-valve, determined to espouse the popular cause of Schleswig-Holstein. The Kings of Prussia and Hanover sent each a division, and a little later the Diet of the German Confederation likewise declared war on Denmark.

Into the details of the struggle, although it forms a study of exceptional interest, it is not necessary to go.
The salient fact was that the Danes had a fleet while the Germans had practically none, and the Danes could move their troops by sea when and where they chose, besides possessing the ability---which they used to the full---of exerting a strict blockade of Prussia's ports.
By the beginning of August the difficulties of the campaign had been brought home to the Prussian general von Wrangel. In a doleful dispatch to the Frankfort Parliament he wrote:

To bring about a peace something more than mere occupation of the enemy's territory is required. The destruction of his army and war material is necessary, and of that, so far as my experience goes, there is no chance. The enemy will continue to avoid battle and to withdraw to the islands under the protection of his ships, and to attack these islands is impossible for a land Power however strong it may be...only by the assistance of an allied fleet will it be possible to compel the enemy to accept battle and to bring about a peace.

The result of the possession by Denmark of islands to which, and of a fleet by which, troops could be transferred at will, brought it about that, although Prussia was the prime mover in the attack on Denmark, by the winter of 1849 she was glad to accept a temporary armistice.
When the campaign was renewed the numerical inferiority of the Danes on land seemed, for the moment, to promise certain victory to Prussia and her allies, but by turning maritime command to most brilliant account the siege of Fredericia was raised by the Danes, and the Germans were completely defeated.
By 1850 the insurgents, abandoned by their German allies, who were intimidated by the attitude of Russia and Austria, laid down their arms. Denmark issued triumphant from the struggle, and had beaten off the onset of a great military Power in two successive campaigns.
The Prussia which had risen like a phoenix from the ashes of Jena, and into whose military decay Scharnhorst and Clausewitz had breathed new life, had been made to seem lath and plaster painted to look like iron.

The political and military humiliation of Prussia had succeeded the outburst of Prussian liberalism; and the liberals had failed chiefly because they had steeped themselves in the error that national aspirations can be won by mere discussion, and without the support of powerful armed forces.

From Moltke

by F. E. Whitton


http://www.donaldbrittonconrad.com/

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